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THESES
1. Europe – understood as the European Union and as individual EU member 
states, the countries of the European Economic Area and the Western Balkan 
states – has played a unique role in China’s policy. On the one hand, it has 
occupied a place in the background, as a partner second to East Asian states 
and the United States. On the other hand, Europe has been China’s biggest 
economic partner and an ‘economic pillar’ supporting China’s growth on 
the international stage. 
2. China views Europe as an ever weaker global actor and one that is largely 
subordinated to the United States. As a consequence, Chinese elites do not 
treat Europe as an equal partner and are convinced that China holds the up-
per hand over Europe. They see a growing asymmetry in bilateral relations. 
China is aware of its advantage over both the European Union as a whole 
and specific European states. China’s sense of its own potential is boosted by 
internal divisions within Europe and by a kind of race for the best possible 
(meaning: the most privileged) relations with China, which has been ongo-
ing between individual EU states. At the same time, Europe does not seem 
to be China’s potential rival, especially since it has shown a positive attitude 
towards China’s rising importance on the international stage. Chinese elites 
consider Europe to be more open to economic and political cooperation with 
Beijing than the United States and non-European Western states. Moreover, 
due to its internal divisions, Europe is being treated by China as an easier 
partner in political and economic negotiations. 
3. For Beijing, Europe is China’s key economic partner. Beijing strives to main-
tain Europe’s open attitude towards the Chinese economy, in particular its 
exports, location of investments and diversification of China’s currency re-
serves. For China, cooperation with Europe is of major importance both in 
the context of the success of China’s continued economic expansion and in 
relation to the current economic and social reforms referred to as a move 
towards a “moderately prosperous society”. Only in selected sectors has 
China’s competition with Europe been evident, although both economies 
remain largely complementary.
4. Cooperation with Europe is necessary to enable China to improve its position 
in the international economic and financial system, mainly in order to legit-
imise China’s actions in the area of multilateralism and global governance. 
Europe’s support will be important in the process of internationalisation of 
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the yuan. Cooperation with Europe helps promote a softer image of China 
and fosters a positive perception of it. Drawing European states away from 
the United States and weakening trans-Atlantic ties will help boost China’s 
status on the international stage.
5. China would like to see Europe’s passive attitude and non-involvement in 
two issues: China’s core interests involving its territorial integrity (the rela-
tions with Taiwan and the disputes on the South China Sea) and Chinese-
-American relations.
6. In its policy towards Europe, China strives to balance two dimensions in-
volving an attempt to use the ongoing rivalry between individual European 
states to win favour with Beijing and an intention to strengthen Europe’s 
unity in areas which Chinese elites would consider favourable, such as 
maintaining the openness of the European market. At the same time, China 
has been consistently diversifying its relations with Europe to avoid becom-
ing dependent on just one partner.
7. In the context of the diversified mechanisms of China’s cooperation with 
Europe, bilateral relations remain the major tool in China’s policy. Beijing 
applies the method of ‘rewarding and punishing’ specific states. Aside from 
its bilateral cooperation with the EU’s strongest member states such as Ger-
many, the United Kingdom and France, China has also maintained relations 
with smaller countries. China has begun to experiment with multilateral 
cooperation formats. It has created a unique cooperation format with Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe known as ‘16+1’, and promoted the concept of the 
New Silk Road as a new formula for the development of cooperation with 
individual European states. Moreover, Beijing attaches ever greater sig-
nificance to dialogue with European Union institutions, in particular over 
economic matters.
8. From China’s perspective, the case of the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB), established by China in 2015, has been a particularly good ex-
ample of Beijing’s excellent relations with Europe. Numerous European 
countries have declared their access to the Bank as founding members, 
thereby legitimising the Chinese vision of global governance and promoting 
China’s rising importance in the international order. The process of specific 
countries joining the project was not coordinated at a European level. Addi-
tionally, European states joined this institution in disregard of open protest 
by the United States.
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this text is to reconstruct and analyse China’s policy towards 
Europe, i.e. the European Union, selected EU member states and non-EU coun-
tries (members of the European Economic Area and the Western Balkan states 
which are candidates for EU membership)1. Part one reconstructs how Europe 
is viewed by Chinese ruling elites and proposes answers to questions involving 
China’s assessment of the role of Europe in the international arena, the state of 
European integration and the balance of power in Europe, as well as European-
-American relations. Part two contains an analysis of the goals of China’s policy 
towards Europe, particularly in areas such as economic policy, international 
order and the process of internal transformations in China. Part three offers 
an analysis of the range of methods China uses in its policy towards Europe, 
including in bilateral relations with selected European states and in the recent 
format of cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe under 
the umbrella of ‘16+1’. 
When analysing China’s policy towards Europe, the main difficulty involves 
a limited amount of credible sources. Similarly to official documents, the official 
discourse by the Chinese leadership, presents a very positive view on Chinese-
-European relations, yet it does not enable any reconstruction of Beijing’s real 
goals. On the other hand, China’s analytical discourse is frequently shaped by 
ideology and by the need to reaffirm the line of foreign policy imposed by the 
Communist Party of China. Moreover, there is a risk that Chinese experts may 
prefer to interpret the intentions behind the actions carried out by the country’s 
leadership rather than present their independent view of the situation. 
This text refers to the analysis of both the official discourse and the debate en-
gaging Chinese commentators, researchers and analysts. For this purpose, it 
was necessary to define China’s most widespread assessment of its policy to-
wards Europe. Aside from the analysis of official documents and public debate, 
the author refers to informal interviews carried out with representatives of 
Chinese think-tanks and academic institutions during conferences and semi-
nars. Moreover, an analysis of China’s policy enables verification of the views 
expressed by Chinese commentators.
1 In this view, European policy does not include policy towards post-Soviet countries in East-
ern Europe such as Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. Similarly, Turkey has not been an ele-
ment of China’s European policy.
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I. HOW CHINA VIEWS EUROPE: A WEAKER AND DIVIDED 
PARTNER
An the level of political declarations, China treats the European Union as one 
of the three most important global actors, alongside the United States and Rus-
sia2. China sees its relations with the EU as an element of the most important 
bilateral relations in the contemporary world and defines it as a “comprehen-
sive strategic partnership for mutual benefit and win-win cooperation”3. In 
Chinese rhetoric, the EU has repeatedly been appreciated as a global partner 
of key importance for the creation of a multipolar international order. Beijing 
often emphasises that China and the EU are linked by a strategic consensus 
over this matter. During his 2014 visit to Europe, Xi Jinping called on the Eu-
ropean partners to build “four bridges” between China and Europe involving 
peace, growth, reform and civilization and to create a strategic partnership 
which could have a greater impact on global affairs. The Chinese leader re-
ferred to China and Europe as “two major powers, two huge markets, two 
great civilizations”. Moreover, in its official discourse China strongly supports 
European integration.
Over the first three years following the assumption of power by the so-called 
fifth generation of leaders of the Communist Party of China (i.e. President 
[and the Party’s Secretary General] Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Li Ke-
qiang), the new leaders paid numerous visits to Europe. In November 2013, 
the first China–EU summit since the change of power was held in Beijing. At 
the summit, both sides adopted the cooperation agenda until 2020. In 2014, 
Beijing published a policy document presenting the Chinese vision of the 
country’s relations with the EU. During his trip to Europe, Xi Jinping visited 
EU institutions in Brussels as the first ever Chinese leader. Celebrations 
commemorating the 40th anniversary of the launch of bilateral relations be-
tween China and the then European Economic Community were the leading 
theme in Chinese-European contacts in 2015. They were supplemented by 
a series of bilateral meetings with European leaders and a summit in the 
‘16+1’ format held in China.
2 Global strategy for Chinese diplomacy (2013–2023), Shanghai Institutes for International 
Studies, http://www.siis.org.cn/uploadfile/2013/1108/20131108095514968.pdf
3 China’s Policy Paper on the EU: Deepen the China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership 
for Mutual Benefit and Win-win Cooperation, Beijing, April 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.
cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzcs/t1143406.shtml 
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However, the documents and the official declarations made by Chinese leaders 
in diplomatic forums offer just an outline of how Europe is really viewed by 
Chinese elites. 
1. Europe’s global weakness
The Chinese perception of Europe is based on a belief that there exists a certain 
asymmetry between these two actors and that this asymmetry is favourable to 
China. Europe is considered an ever weaker global player, which additionally 
is unable to function in the international arena as an actor fully independent 
of the United States.
The process of Chinese elites altering their assessment of Europe’s place in the 
international order started around the year 2005. Back in 2003–2004, China 
seemed to attach priority importance to its cooperation with the EU. They hoped 
that the EU would adopt a different stance in international politics to that of 
America’s unilateralism combined with its readiness to use military force. China 
hoped that the EU would transform into one of the pillars of a multipolar order 
and would be able to counterbalance the US. For Beijing, the first warning sign 
came with the EU not lifting its embargo on the sale of arms to China in 2005.
Doubts regarding Europe’s independence were aggravated by the global eco-
nomic crisis which started in 20084. China began to increasingly view the 
European Union as an ever weaker global actor. Beijing abandoned its hopes 
involving the creation of an ‘international axis’ together with Europe. China 
concluded that the EU’s ability to shape international relations was much lower 
than its ambitions5. From then on, China no longer treated the EU as a potential 
counterbalance to the US. The only exception has been the area of international 
financial relations, in which the existence of the euro does act to counterbalance 
the status of the US dollar. 
In China’s eyes, Europe’s political importance began to diminish further after 
the eurozone crisis, which China considered a symptom of a systemic crisis of 
the European integration project. Attempts by several European states to attract 
Chinese funds, precipitated by the crisis, inspired Beijing to believe that the 
4 Zhang Jian, EU Prospects after the European Debt Crisis, Contemporary International Rela-
tions, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2015, pp. 56-74.
5 Pang Zhongying, China-EU Strategic Partnership and the Transformation of Global Gov-
ernance, China International Studies, July/August 2015, p. 46.
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European Union was becoming ever weaker in economic terms and politically 
divided also. Additionally, these attempts helped boost the confidence of China’s 
leadership6. Presenting the European project as a failure has become axiomatic 
in Chinese debate. The dynamics within the EU was seen as proof of the collapse 
of European integration and the fall of the European model of capitalism. 
According to Chinese elites, the attractiveness of the European economic mod-
el has diminished, in parallel with the EU’s economic position and global in-
fluence7. Since the eurozone crisis, the case of the EU has been viewed more 
as a warning than a model8. In the times of budget cuts, European countries are 
being perceived as actors having little room for manoeuvre in their relations 
with China. The narrative involving the need to rescue the euro or China bailing 
out Europe has dominated the debate. According to the policy document pub-
lished by the Chinese government in 2014, following the eurozone crisis the EU 
has faced its biggest challenge since the end of the Cold War and requires deep 
structural reforms9. The position adopted by the head of the Chinese parlia-
ment’s foreign affairs committee seems meaningful: Fu Ying referred to the EU 
as an “intermediate power” which stands in between the old powers and the new 
rising powers, similarly to Russia and Japan. At the same time, she suggested 
that one should not expect that Europe, which is still trying to recover from its 
economic malaise, could regain its previous status any time soon10. 
China’s major disappointment with Europe was accompanied by a rapid in-
crease in the Chinese elite’s confidence and a growing popularity of the belief 
that China was being transformed into global power number two. The EU has 
remained in the same position in the international order which it occupied 
10 years ago. As a consequence of these processes, the relative symmetry be-
tween the partners has evidently shifted towards China’s advantage.
6 Mei Zhaorong (梅兆荣), Germany’s path of renewed growth – position within the EU and 
in EU-China relations, German Studies, 1/2013, http://www.faobserver.com/NewsInfo.
aspx?id=8636
7 Feng Zhongping (冯仲平), Prospects for the EU’s development and China-EU relations, Contem-
porary International Relations, 9/2012, http://www.faobserver.com/NewsInfo.aspx?id=8074; 
Liao Shuting (廖书庭), Chen Xiao (陈箫), China-EU relations after the European debt crisis, 
Journal of Hunan Institute, 1/2014.
8 Zhang Jian (张建), Role of interactions between powers in China-EU relations, Contemporary 
International Relations, 4/2013.
9 China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for Mutual Benefit and Win-win Coopera-
tion.
10 Fu Ying, 2014: A Turning Point in the Global Order, Contemporary International Relations, 
Vol. 25, No. 2, p. 3.
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2. The trans-Atlantic context
The state of trans-Atlantic relations plays a particularly important role in 
shaping how Europe is viewed in China. For Chinese elites, the degree of in-
dependence of the European Union and European countries from the United 
States is a significant indicator of Europe’s position in the international order 
and of Europe’s importance as China’s political partner. From China’s perspec-
tive, close cooperation between the EU and the US is a sign of Europe’s subor-
dination to America’s politics and goals11. Chinese elites count on a weakening 
of trans-Atlantic ties. The greater the differences between the EU and the US, 
the more important a partner the EU becomes. Similarly, the stronger the ties 
between Washington and European capitals, the smaller the EU’s importance 
for Beijing12. 
Regardless of the differing levels of importance of the US and the EU for China 
and of its diverse policy towards these two actors, Chinese elites frequently 
treat Europe and America as the homogeneous West. This West is guided by 
ideology, involving mainly the promotion of the Western model of democracy. 
According to certain prominent Chinese politicians, to achieve this the West is 
ready to stage a so-called colour revolution in China to challenge China’s politi-
cal system13.
At the same time, the assessment of the consequences of European-American 
rapprochement in specific areas, such as the economy or security, is ambiguous. 
In the case of the main trans-Atlantic project, the so-called Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the economic and strategic assessments 
made by Chinese politicians and commentators are clearly divergent. Accord-
ing to politicians and experts specializing in economic affairs, TTIP poses no 
threat. Moreover, it could provide additional impetus for carrying out reforms 
and boosting the competitiveness of the Chinese economy. Prime Minister 
11 Referring to the political crisis in the EU related to the influx of refugees, one Chinese 
expert pointed to Europe’s mistakes involving pursuit of the American ‘democratisation’ 
agenda and to the fact that Europe should be able to perform its own strategic judgement. 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/941297.shtml 
12 Some Western analysts suggest that the contrary is the case, i.e. Europe is treated more 
seriously when it closely cooperates with the US and other G7 states. This is when China 
recognizes this cooperation and is more willing to alter its own policy.
13 Sun Jianguo, Upholding the Chinese Approach to National Security, China International 
Studies, No. 51, March/April 2015, pp. 15-16. The author is deputy chief of general staff of 
China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
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Li Keqiang, in particular, seems to support this line of discourse, seeing TTIP 
as an external instrument to put pressure on privileged entities operating in the 
Chinese economy such as state-controlled companies. Alongside this, experts 
who view the international order in the context of strategic challenges see 
TTIP as a manifestation of unity between Europe and the United States, which 
as such also poses a certain threat. Washington is viewed as an actor which 
tries to exclude China from “globalisation of high standards” and increase stra-
tegic control over Europe and Asia14 through the trade agreements of TTIP and 
TPP (Transpacific Partnership). Additionally, Beijing fears that the US will try 
to persuade the EU to adopt solutions which would be unfavourable to China, 
such as involving a refusal to grant China the status of a market economy15. 
It may be expected that the significance of the trans-Atlantic factor in China’s 
assessment of Europe will increase against the background of growing differ-
ences between China and America and in the context of an increasingly popular 
consensus in the United States over the need to devise a new deterrence policy 
towards China. The more tense the relations between Beijing and Washington, 
the greater the significance of the position adopted by European states and the 
EU as a whole.
3. Assessment of European integration 
China’s assessment of the ongoing integration processes in Europe reflects 
China’s dual vision of European integration. For the purpose of attaining a por-
tion of its goals, China is interested in maintaining the EU’s weakness, which 
enables Beijing to develop its relations with individual states separately. Beijing 
has greatly benefited from the existing divisions within the EU and from at-
tempts by individual states to develop the best possible bilateral relations with 
China. On the other hand, a strong and unified Europe would be better for China 
in the context of Beijing’s ambitions to attain some of its economic goals and 
to build a multipolar order. Unlike Russia, China does not intend to challenge 
European integration. A failure of the European integration project is not in 
China’s interest, mainly due to Europe’s economic importance as a factor which 
counterbalances American dominance, and to the importance of the euro 
as a counterbalance to the US dollar. 
14 Wang Yiwei (王义桅), Three intercontinental effects of Chinese-European cooperation, 
http://ies.cass.cn/Article/tszl/zg/wogw/201410/9162.asp
15 Fu Jing, Warning to EU exposes bias against China, China Daily, 2 October 2015.
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At the same time, Chinese analysts suggest that European integration itself 
is at a crossroads due to an increase in Eurosceptic forces and to the possible 
exit of the United Kingdom from the EU16. The EU refugee crisis is an indirect 
result of insufficient political integration and of financial limitations within 
the European Union17. An increase in anti-integration sentiment and populist 
political forces is assessed in two ways. On the one hand, Chinese experts are 
critical of the changes in European internal politics. They generally condemn 
the growing importance of extreme right parties in Europe, which they refer to 
as “extremist”. This suggests that China is increasingly willing to look at Europe 
from a position of moral supremacy and to manifest its confidence in bilateral 
relations. On the other hand, China is concerned at seeing the development of 
anti-European forces, because if they assumed power they could pursue a pro-
tectionist policy which would be strongly unfavourable to China18.
4. Assessment of Chinese-European relations
In their official statements, Chinese politicians and commentators assess Chi-
nese-European relations very positively. One should not, however, interpret 
their statements assuring a strategic partnership between the two sides in 
literal terms. On the contrary, positive assessments of China’s relations with 
Europe are a reflection of Beijing’s perceived advantage in bilateral relations. 
The Chinese side is aware of the fact that there is no common European policy 
towards China. According to Beijing, the European Union is “unconditionally 
involved” in its relations with China, it has no strategy towards China and its 
policy lacks unity. This is viewed both positively, as it offers Beijing more op-
portunities to pursue a separate policy towards individual European states, 
and negatively – due to difficulties involved in building long-term cooperation.
The basic difference between China and the European Union involves the un-
derstanding of the nature of the global order which is emerging after the era of 
US hegemony. What Chinese elites expect is multipolarity under which several 
powers would practically shape the agenda of global politics and dominate on 
a regional scale. The European Union, for its part, counts on the emergence of 
multilateralism, i.e. multilateral mechanisms to govern global issues, in which 
none of the various powers would occupy a privileged position and decisions 
16 Pang, op. cit., p. 45.
17 http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/941297.shtml 
18 Mei Zhaorong, op. cit.
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would be taken by way of a broad consensus. Beijing uses the term ‘multilateral-
ism’ when it finds it suitable in the context of its tactical needs. The language of 
official documents which describe China’s relations with the European Union 
is dominated by the term ‘multipolarity’.
Chinese experts and commentators emphasize the fact that there is no ma-
jor conflict of interest between China and the EU19. The number of potential 
disputes is limited, and the number of spheres of cooperation is large and 
suited to China’s needs. In the context of this positive assessment, of equal 
importance is the conviction that Europe does not treat China as a future 
threat to its security or international position. Contrary to the debate ongoing 
in the United States, in Europe China’s growth is not viewed in geopolitical 
categories. In direct contrast, Beijing perceives that European elites consider 
China’s growth as an opportunity which Europe itself could exploit. Europe is 
much readier to accept China as another superpower than the United States 
is. Europe already considers China to be the second superpower. This is evi-
denced for example by the level of attention surrounding President Xi’s visits 
to Europe. Moreover, the EU is seen as that part of the West which was the 
first to recognize the need to reform the global international order, mainly 
to adapt multilateral institutions such as the IMF or the World Bank to the 
changing balance of power20.
From Beijing’s perspective, economic relations with Europe are of key impor-
tance. Chinese elites assess the economic interests of the two actors as largely 
complementary. In China, the popular view is that Europe has technologies and 
China has a dynamic domestic market. When they emerge, economic conflicts 
have no impact on relations as a whole. Moreover, from China’s perspective, 
economic cooperation has become more balanced. Investments are no longer 
one-sided, i.e. they involve not only European investment projects carried out 
in China. The number of Chinese investments in Europe has been on the rise21. 
Positive assessments of Chinese-European relations are reflected in the as-
sessment of China’s relations with individual EU member states. According to 
Beijing, China’s relations with Germany can be considered exemplary and can 
19 China has assessed positively its cooperation with Europe in the field of non-traditional 
security threats such as maritime piracy and international terrorism.
20 Pang, op. cit., p. 42.
21 Mei Zhaorong, op. cit.
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be described as “a new type of relations between powers”22. China’s relations 
with the United Kingdom and with France are assessed equally positively. At 
the same time, it should be noted that at present no European state has bad or 
unsatisfactory relations with China. Even those states which openly criticised 
China’s policy in the area of human rights no longer emphasize these issues in 
bilateral relations. The European Commission, for its part, has been involved 
in “regular dialogue” with China over these matters23. 
According to Chinese experts, potentially contentious issues between China and 
the EU include: the need to import fuels, China’s economic and political pres-
ence in Africa, and climate change prevention. However, Beijing is convinced 
that even these controversial issues are unlikely to negatively impact bilateral 
relations. 
China’s negative image in European societies is a factor which the Chinese side 
finds the most disturbing. European elites treat Beijing as an essential partner 
and are enthusiastic about cooperation. However, public opinion polls indicate 
that most European nations are rather distrustful of China. Criticism is ever 
more frequent and the public is becoming ever more sensitive, such as towards 
Chinese investments, for example. This is well illustrated by discontent within 
British society with China’s planned involvement in the construction of a British 
nuclear power plant24.
22 Jiang Shixue (江时学), Relations between China and Germany are also a new type of relations 
between powers, China Strategy Observer, http://ies.cass.cn/Article/cbw/zogx/201409/9110.asp 
23 http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china/eu_china/political_relations/humain_rights_di-
alogue/index_en.htm 
24 Mei Zhaorong, op. cit. 
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II. CHINA’S INTERESTS AND GOALS TOWARDS EUROPE:  
THE ECONOMY ABOVE ALL
The overriding goal of Beijing’s foreign policy involves shaping the interna-
tional order in such a way as to help the Communist Party of China remain in 
power. The goals of China’s policy towards Europe should be viewed in this 
context as well. 
1. Maintaining Europe’s economic openness 
China’s interests and goals towards Europe are mainly defined in the area of 
the economy. Economic cooperation is the primary pillar of Chinese-European 
relations. For a decade now, the EU has been China’s economic partner number 
one25. In 2014, trade turnover between China and the EU was 467 billion euros 
(according to EU statistics)26. The value of trade between China and the EU sig-
nificantly exceeds 1 billion euros per day. Aside from the United States, Europe 
has been the major market for Chinese goods. China’s exports to the EU reached 
302 billion euros, and its imports – 164 billion euros (see Table 1 in the Appendix). 
China’s trade surplus has been gradually diminishing since 2011, mainly due to 
a decrease in exports to Europe27. 
China sees Europe as a place to diversify its financial assets by locating invest-
ments there. Cooperation with Europe enables Chinese companies to gain access 
to advanced technologies and to acquire global brands28. From Beijing’s perspec-
tive, the low level of political risk is Europe’s other major advantage. Although 
the eurozone crisis challenged the effectiveness of the European economic mod-
el, at the same time it is being perceived as an opportunity for China, enabling 
Beijing to strengthen its economic position in Europe. Unlike other Western 
countries such as the US, Canada, Japan and Australia, Europe is considered 
much more open to China’s investment activity and economic involvement. 
In this context, Beijing’s primary goal is to maintain and expand Europe’s open-
ness to Chinese exports and investments, both capital investments and direct 
25 China has been ranked the EU’s second trade partner after the US.
26 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/china/ 
27 In 2008, the figure was US$210 billion, whereas in 2013 it was a mere US$ 130 billion. For 
comparison, in 2013 China’s trade surplus with the US was US$300 billion.
28 Liu Haixing (刘海星), Assistance to Europe is actually assistance to China itself, Global 
Knowledge, 1/2013, http://www.faobserver.com/NewsInfo.aspx?id=8099 
17
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
4/
20
16
investments. Equally important is increased access of Chinese companies to the 
European market and the  creation of conditions fostering fair competition for 
these companies to operate in Europe29. China intends to avoid trade disputes 
with the EU.
Therefore, China attaches key importance to preventing the rise of protection-
ism in Europe, to limiting the scale of application of non-tariff tools by the EU 
in its trade policy, as well as to minimizing Europe’s potential objections to-
wards the role of the Chinese state in China’s economy, which involves, for ex-
ample, offering support to exporters in the form of preferential loans. The list 
of potential reservations Europe could voice to limit China’s access to the EU 
market includes practices and legislation which allow discrimination, forced 
joint ventures and technology transfers, access to public tenders, access to the 
service market, the issue of intellectual property and investor protection. In 
China, foreign companies have limited or zero access to sectors such as bank-
ing, construction and telecommunications. China wants to keep the European 
economy open and at the same time intends to avoid having to offer an adequate 
response, i.e. increased access of European companies to the Chinese market. 
China’s goals also include gaining access to those sectors which so far have been 
closed to Chinese companies, as in the sector of public tenders, for instance. 
Beijing intends to enter the lucrative market of infrastructural investments. 
It sees Europe as a place to locate investments in the most promising branches 
of the economy in the context of export of Chinese technology. These include 
high-speed rail and nuclear energy.
China would like to see European states open their markets to Chinese compa-
nies involved in technology transfer and purchase30. European goods exported 
to China are subject to less strict control than goods from the United States. 
Access to advanced technologies is indispensable for the implementation of the 
“Made in China 2025” strategy which contains plans for a rapid improvement in 
the quality of Chinese industrial production in the coming decade.
29 Feng Zhongping (冯仲平), The situation in Europe and Chinese-European relations in 
2013, China Institute of Strategy & Management, http://www.21ccom.net/articles/world/
zlwj/20150115119042_all.html 
30 In contrast to the country’s previous leadership, China’s current leaders never mention, at 
least in public, the issue of lifting the embargo for the sale of weapons to China. This may 
result from the awareness that attaining this goal would be extremely difficult at present. 
It seems that when formulating the goals of China’s policy towards Europe, China’s new 
leadership is not willing to get involved in battles which they are likely to lose.
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The first step towards China attaining its goals involves negotiations over the 
so-called Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) between China and the European 
Union. BIT is to replace the 27 bilateral investment treaties which have so far 
been in force31. It is the first agreement of this type to be negotiated between 
China and the European Commission, and not with governments of individual 
EU member states. 
Another method of maintaining or even increasing Europe’s openness to Chi-
nese goods involves China being granted the status of a market economy within 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). China was accepted to the WTO in 2001, 
but at that time it did not receive the status of a market economy automatically. 
The lack of such status makes it easier for the European Union (similarly to 
other members of the organization) to apply anti-dumping measures towards 
Chinese producers. Moreover, the fact of China being granted this status by the 
EU could convince other states, primarily the US, to do so as well. The prede-
cessors of the current Chinese leaders had tried for years to convince the EU to 
grant China the status of a market economy, yet to no avail. China’s present au-
thorities claim that China is to be granted this status in 2016, fifteen years after 
joining the WTO. According to them, this is in line with the agreements made 
in 2001. In this situation, Beijing decided to no longer emphasize this issue in its 
relations with Europe. A dispute is underway in Europe involving interpreta-
tion of the conditions of China’s accession to the WTO. Various interest groups, 
including in particular industrial producers and governments of some EU mem-
ber states, have voiced concerns over the issue in an attempt to press for refusing 
to grant China the status of a market economy in 2016. The final decision should 
be made by the European Commission, though pressure by individual European 
governments concerning this issue is likely. European industrial associations 
have already called on the European Commission to refuse to grant China the 
status of a market economy due to unfair competition practices.
In the long term, China is interested in signing a free trade agreement (FTA) 
with the EU, which would guarantee Chinese companies access to the Europe-
an market. Beijing should expect increased resistance towards close economic 
cooperation with China on the part of some European companies. This resist-
ance is likely to be expressed by those businesses which are the most exposed 
to competition both in the European market and in third country markets. In 
a growing number of industrial categories Chinese companies are becoming 
31 Ireland has not signed such a treaty.
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significant competitors for European businesses. At present, both sides are ne-
gotiating the feasibility of the planned free trade area. European states have 
been divided over this issue, with the United Kingdom being one of the most 
ardent supporters of FTA.
For China, its cooperation with Europe also serves the purpose of diversifying 
its currency reserves. Europe is increasingly being viewed as a safe location 
for Chinese financial surpluses, involving both financial investments and di-
rect investments. According to estimates, around a third of Chinese reserves 
are euro reserves. China has repeatedly expressed its willingness to purchase 
Eurobonds, although no details of such transactions have ever been revealed. 
China still treats the euro as ‘too big to fail’. 
2. Legitimising China in the international economic order
Since the 2008–2009 global economic crisis at least, China has been increasingly 
keen on improving its position in the processes of global economic governance 
to reflect Beijing’s economic potential. In this context, Europe’s role is of key 
importance. Chinese elites consider both individual European states and the EU 
as a whole ready to accept China’s role of the second global superpower.
As a consequence, Beijing intends to win support from the EU and individual 
European countries for a shift in its position in the global economic and finan-
cial order32. In the context of the growing objections on the part of the US, which 
is evident, for example, in the US blocking the attempts to increase the signifi-
cance of China’s role in the International Monetary Fund, Europe is becoming 
a key player in helping China boost its status and its role in the international 
economic and financial order. Beijing sees Europe as a partner able to help le-
gitimise China’s increased significance in the international arena. Beijing rec-
ognizes the influence that Europe, including European media, has on global 
public opinion. Therefore, it hopes that its cooperation with Europe within the 
global economic and financial order will contribute to boosting China’s image 
on a global scale. 
On the one hand, Beijing intends to strengthen its position in institutions such 
as the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank. It expects its signifi-
cance to be increased and the yuan to be gradually transformed into another 
32 http://carnegietsinghua.org/publications/?fa=61182 
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reserve currency, aside from the dollar and the euro33. In this context, the EU 
may become China’s ally in supporting its demands. On the other hand, China 
has already begun to create a parallel structure of financial institutions. This 
is being done in a closed circle of countries, with partners from BRICS (a new 
development bank), and by way of establishing multilateral institutions open to 
all potentially interested countries (this is the case of the establishment of the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank – AIIB). In this case, Europe’s support 
for Chinese initiatives can be interpreted as strong legitimisation of Beijing’s 
actions.
3. Favouring Europe’s passivity and non-involvement
China has been formulating increasingly stronger expectations regarding Eu-
rope’s behaviour towards China’s ‘core interests’. Another goal of Beijing’s policy 
towards Europe involves convincing both the EU as a whole and individual Eu-
ropean states to adopt a passive stance and limit Europe’s involvement in areas 
which are of key importance to China. The number of issues in which Beijing 
expects ‘silence’ on the part of Europe has been on the rise. Beijing sees any 
activity regarding these issues as “interfering with China’s internal affairs”34.
In practice, China’s ‘core interests’ associated with its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity refer to several issues: Tibet and Xinjiang as provinces exposed to the 
risk of separatism (according to Beijing), Hong Kong as a region threatened by 
a different political system, Taiwan as a region that may want to become inde-
pendent and – increasingly – Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea.
Formulating its interests vis-à-vis Europe, China willingly uses phrases sug-
gesting that it expects understanding and support for the selected development 
path which reflects China’s national priorities, as well as continued respect 
for and recognition of China’s core interests35. A document which discusses 
these issues in the most comprehensive manner is China’s Policy Paper on the 
EU adopted in 2014. Beijing expects that to abide by the “one-China principle” 
Europe will limit its contacts with Taiwan to non-official and people-to-people 
activities, that it will not support Taiwan’s accession to any international 
33 Europe expressed its support for Chinese aspirations by adding the yuan to the basket of 
IMF’s reserve currencies back in December 2015. This was mainly done at the cost of the euro.
34 See for example Zhang Linchu (张林初), The situation in Europe and Chinese-European rela-
tions in 2014, Peace and Development, http://comment.cfisnet.com/2014/1224/1300274.html
35 China’s Policy Paper on the EU, op. cit. 
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organization whose membership requires statehood and will not sell weap-
ons to Taiwan36. Regarding Tibet, China has appealed to Europe not to support 
“Tibetan independence” and not to not allow leaders of the Dalai Lama to visit 
the EU or its member states under any capacity or pretext37. As far as human 
rights protection is concerned, China has emphasized its openness to dialogue, 
while stating that the EU itself needs to abide by certain principles such as 
dialogue in the spirit of equality. In practice, this means that the EU is unable 
to openly articulate its criticism of China. 
Another issue in which China would welcome Europe’s non-involvement is Chi-
nese-American relations, mainly in East Asia. This is particularly important in 
the context of rising tension in Beijing’s relations with Washington. Although 
China does not see Europe as a threat in East Asia, in order to attain its goals 
in this region it intends to weaken the West’s unity. Beijing therefore expects 
Europe to be passive. From among European states, only France and the United 
Kingdom have political and military interests in East Asia. Both countries still 
have military infrastructure in the Asia-Pacific region, they provide modern 
weapons to the region’s states and are interested in the region’s stability due to 
their economic interests. They are also participants in military exercises which 
the US regularly organises in the region (e.g. RIMPAC). Additionally, due to its 
economic ties with Asia, Europe cares about the safety of maritime routes in 
the region.
Of equal importance is Europe’s non-involvement in regional issues in East Asia. 
This mainly involves Europe’s refusal to support the US in its disputes regard-
ing the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Referring to the principles 
of “mutual tolerance and equality”, China considers it necessary for Europe to 
accept Beijing’s actions in its “sovereign territory” in the Asia-Pacific region38. 
36 Ibidem.
37 However, if such a meeting is held, China’s response is a set of more or less severe ‘sanctions’ 
such as limiting political and diplomatic contacts and hindering economic cooperation. In 
2007, Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel received the Dalai Lama on an official visit. In 
2008, the then President of France, Nicolas Sarkozy, openly boycotted the Olympic Games 
opening ceremony in Beijing, pointing to mistakes in China’s policy towards Tibet. In 2012, 
British Prime Minister David Cameron held a meeting with Dalai Lama. In all these cases 
China’s response involved a temporary limitation of official contacts. Beijing expected its 
European partners to symbolically confirm China’s supremacy over Tibet and to withdraw 
from their policy pursued so far, however, it did not expect any far-reaching concessions. In 
practice, this served as a kind of ritual Beijing considered necessary.
38 Liu Haixing (刘海星), The situation in Europe and Chinese-European relations in 2012, Con-
temporary World, http://dangjian.people.com.cn/n/2012/1219/c117092-19938869.html
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Examples of European measures which have provoked a reaction on the part of 
China include a joint statement issued by leaders of the EU and Japan in Novem-
ber 2013 and a June 2015 statement by G7 countries. Referring to the communiqué 
issued by the G7 Group in June 2015 which contained objections towards China’s 
unilateral actions (although China was not specifically named), a commenta-
tor representing the government-controlled news agency, Xinhua, expressed 
his opinion that European states, with their crisis-ridden economies, should 
refrain from damaging their close trade and economic relations with China by 
mentioning the South China Sea issue39. 
4. Support for Chinese reforms 
Cooperation with Europe has been an important element of internal reforms 
in China, frequently referred to as a move towards a “moderately prosperous 
society”. The central point of these reforms involves a change in the economic 
development model from one based on export and infrastructure investment 
towards one that relies on the service sector and domestic consumption. The 
EU can be an important partner in the process of altering the Chinese model of 
economic development towards: increased domestic consumption (including 
meeting the demand for European goods by the ever expanding middle class), 
opening of the market to services and investments, altering the role of the state 
in the economy (i.e. less control over the economy and less price regulation in 
exchange for boosting the importance of the market in the economy). Improv-
ing the condition of the natural environment is another important element of 
the reforms. Devising social policy represents another big challenge for China. 
Europe’s experience in this respect (both positive and negative) is treated as an 
important reference point. 
At the same time, China is carrying out a number of conflicting actions within 
the reform process, which impacts Beijing’s policy towards Europe. On the one 
hand, China intends to step up the party’s control over society and politics but, 
on the other hand, it is attempting to introduce the principles of the rule of law. 
In the latter case, China is ready to cooperate with Europe in matters such as 
reform of the judiciary, though it is likely that this refers only to technical issues 
and not the underlying assumption involving independence of judicial power.
39 Chen Shilei, Commentary: South China Sea issue not major concern of Western countries, 
Xinhua, 8 June 2015.
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III. CHINA’S SET OF INSTRUMENTS TOWARDS EUROPE
In its policy towards Europe, China is trying to balance two dimensions: one 
attempting to use the competition between individual European states for Bei-
jing’s favours and the other involving the intention to strengthen Europe’s unity 
in areas which Chinese elites consider favourable to China, such as maintain-
ing the openness of the European market. On the one hand, China is taking 
advantage of Europe’s internal rivalry involving, for example, the creation of 
a settlement centre for the yuan. On the other hand, Beijing intends to avoid any 
accusations that it challenges the EU’s unity. At the same time, in its relations 
with Europe China wants to avoid becoming dependent on just one partner and 
strives to maintain good cooperation with all the European states. However, 
the frequency and the level of advancement of these relations depends on the 
conditions offered by individual states.
1. Supporting the ‘race for China’ 
China’s bilateral relations with European states remain the most important 
method of pursuing its policy towards Europe. Maintaining bilateral relations 
enables Beijing to avoid becoming dependent on just one partner. Beijing has 
been in a favourable situation in particular since the eurozone crisis – it has 
been taking advantage of the ‘race for China’ which is ongoing in Europe. 
As part of this ‘race’, individual states are trying to obtain from China as much 
as possible and to achieve the status of a key partner and a ‘gateway’ to Europe. 
Beijing is taking advantage of fears present in individual European countries that 
they may be pushed outside the mainstream of economic relations with China. 
As a consequence, Beijing has managed to create a situation in which none of its 
European partners expresses reservations about China’s internal policy. Even 
the Czech Republic and the Baltic states, which previously emphasized the is-
sue of human rights, felt forced to change their rhetoric and establish closer 
political ties with China.
Although China tends to temporarily favour specific countries, over the long 
term it tries to maintain close relations with the three most prominent EU 
states: Germany, France and the United Kingdom, as well as with other, smaller 
member states.
Germany enjoys special status due to its key role in European politics and to the 
significance for China of the import of advanced technologies from Germany. 
China still seems to be impressed by the effectiveness of Germany’s economic 
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policy. Beijing views Germany as a leader which emerged after the eurozone 
crisis to replace the previous German-French tandem40. China appreciates Ger-
many’s key role in resolving the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. At the same time, 
China views Germany as an actor which is unable to dominate the EU or trans-
form into a global power on its own. The format of China’s bilateral relations 
with Germany is the most comprehensive of all bilateral cooperation formats 
and comprises intergovernmental consultations and 40 dialogue mechanisms 
which were expanded in 2014 by foreign policy and security issues. Germany 
has been Europe’s second largest recipient of Chinese investments (around 7 bil-
lion euros in 2014).
The United Kingdom is important due to its political significance, including its 
permanent membership of the UN Security Council and its close relations with 
the United States. As far as economic cooperation is concerned, currently the UK 
has been the top recipient of Chinese investments. China’s positive assessment 
of the United Kingdom is motivated by the UK’s considerable economic open-
ness, its thriving service sector (involving financial services in particular) and 
its liberal economic model. The UK has been Europe’s biggest investor in Chinese 
bonds – around US$50 billion in 2014. In 2000–2014, China’s investments in the 
United Kingdom were worth 12 billion euros (Europe’s top figure). The UK was 
the first state, aside from China, to issue yuan-denominated sovereign bonds. 
The first bonds China’s central bank issued abroad were issued in the United 
Kingdom. At the same time, Chinese commentators are aware of the threat of 
the UK’s self-marginalization resulting from its difficult relations with Brussels.
France is important to China due to its UNSC membership and its economic 
potential, including its civilian nuclear sector. France has been ranked Europe’s 
third largest recipient of Chinese investments (around 6 billion euros).
2. Experimenting with multilateral cooperation formats
Apart from developing bilateral relations with a number of European states, 
China is active in multilateral cooperation. Since Xi Jinping took power, Chi-
na’s relations with the European Union have become more dynamic. China is 
continuing its format of cooperation with Central-Eastern Europe referred to 
40 Zhang Jian, EU Prospects after the European Debt Crisis, Contemporary International Rela-
tions, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2015, pp. 60-61; Li Chao, Future of Germany’s Policy of Active Diplomacy, 
Contemporary International Relations, Vol. 24, No. 6, pp. 111-126.
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as ‘16+1’, launched in 2012. Additionally, Beijing has included Europe in the New 
Silk Road concept. 
The ‘16+1’ format was launched in the final years of Hu Jintao’s rule. In 2011, on 
Beijing’s initiative an economic forum was organized in Budapest. A year later, 
the first meeting at the level of the heads of government was held in Warsaw. 
This was the official launch of the ‘16+1’ cooperation format. This format repre-
sents an experiment in China’s policy towards Europe, mainly due to the fact 
that the European countries it comprises differ greatly from each other. These 
countries include both certain EU member states (Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Croatia and 
Slovenia) and candidate countries from the Western Balkans (Serbia, Monte-
negro, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania).
The sources of inspiration behind the creation of this format included China’s 
interest in expanding its economic presence in Central-Eastern Europe, includ-
ing in areas such as infrastructure, energy and agriculture, and in building 
a transport corridor to Western Europe under the New Silk Road concept. For 
Beijing, the ‘16+1’ cooperation format is a convenient platform for coordination 
and promotion of its concepts regarding economic cooperation, including by 
boosting competition between the sixteen CEE states. Aside from pursuing 
economic goals, the ‘16+1’ format enables Beijing to pursue political goals also. 
China is employing this multilateral formula to improve its bilateral relations 
with selected CEE states in the long run and to shape EU-China relations. Bei-
jing intends to create a kind of a pro-China lobby within the European Union.
The process of institutionalisation of the ‘16+1’ format has been progressing 
slowly. It mainly involves creating dedicated forums for coordinating specific 
areas of cooperation. Cooperation in individual sectors is usually coordinated 
by one selected state of the region. The key event under the ‘16+1’ cooperation 
format is the annual summit at the level of heads of state. The first element of 
institutionalisation at the intergovernmental level involved the establishment 
of a Permanent Secretariat at the Chinese Foreign Ministry (with its head acting 
in the rank of deputy minister). CEE states were requested to appoint national 
coordinators who meet several times annually. In June 2014, the first meeting of 
ministers responsible for trade and the economy was held. According to plans, 
such meetings are to be organized regularly every two years. In 2015, a meeting 
between health ministers was held under the ‘16+1’ format. Regular meetings 
of representatives of ministries of agriculture are also held. It was announced 
that a forum of young political leaders and an economic cooperation forum will 
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be organized every two years. In 2014–2015, new institutions focused on coordi-
nation of economic cooperation were created. In November 2014, a permanent 
secretariat for investments was created at the Polish Information and Foreign 
Investment Agency. In 2015, the China-CEEC Business Council was created. It 
is coordinated by the Polish Agency for Enterprise Development. In November 
2014, under the ‘16+1’ format an agreement was signed involving the creation of 
a cooperation forum focused on agriculture, coordinated by Bulgaria. In 2014, 
an agency for the promotion of tourist exchange was created with its seat in 
Budapest. Institutionalisation of cooperation in the field of university education 
involved the creation of a consortium of universities managed on a rotational 
basis. The ‘16+1’ format is accompanied by a series of thematic meetings. In 2014, 
a Chinese investment forum was held in the Czech Republic and an investment 
symposium was organized in Xiamen, a seminar focused on technology coop-
eration was held in Shanghai, a think-tank symposium was organized in Slo-
venia and a logistics conference in Latvia.
The New Silk Road concept (currently referred to by China as ‘One Belt, One 
Road’) is becoming another multilateral formula of China’s policy towards Eu-
rope. The concept provides for the creation of overland and maritime transport 
corridors to connect China with Europe. The New Silk Road mainly serves the 
purpose of increasing the access of Chinese goods to the European market. It 
is also expected to support the development of central and western regions of 
China. Germany is to be the ‘hub’ for railway transport, whereas Greece is to 
be the ‘hub’ for maritime transport. The Road is hoped to enable China to dispel 
Europe’s fears regarding the ‘divide and conquer’ policy pursued by Beijing and 
to include several European states in the implementation of the Road’s project. 
The New Silk Road is a particularly significant example of an instrument partly 
focused on Europe. It cannot be ruled out that, in order to implement the New 
Silk Road concept, China will seek to create a trilateral cooperation formula 
comprising China, the EU and a third country.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Beijing pursues its policy towards Europe at three levels: at the level of indi-
vidual member states, at EU level and in the ‘16+1’ format. This is expected to 
boost the flexibility and the effectiveness of China’s European policy. Economic 
issues continue to dominate the way China thinks about Europe. Economic ex-
pansion to the European market, entering new sectors, capital investments and 
acquisition of companies will continue to form the axis of China’s policy towards 
Europe. One of Beijing’s priorities still involves maintaining and deepening Eu-
rope’s openness to China’s economic presence. 
At the same time, the significance of Europe’s support for Beijing’s actions aimed 
at boosting China’s status in international politics has been on the rise. For China, 
Europe is becoming a source of legitimisation of Beijing’s policies and an actor 
which boosts China’s credibility in global finance and in the creation of multilat-
eral institutions. The process of establishing the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB) has been the fulfilment of China’s expectations towards Europe and 
its role in the process of improving China’s position in the international arena. 
From Beijing’s perspective, the bank, with China as its initiator and 57 countries 
as its founders, is intended to serve two purposes. Firstly, it offers yet another 
method of investing capital surpluses in promising investments on a global scale. 
Secondly, it is a step towards the creation of an international system parallel to 
that dominated by the US, in which China will have the right to veto and a deci-
sive vote. Originally, back in 2015 China intended the AIIB to be limited to Asian 
states only. An official declaration of access to the project, expressed by the United 
Kingdom, convinced a number of other European states to do so as well. Europe’s 
involvement in China’s initiative boosted its credibility, in particular in the con-
text of strong objections voiced by the US. It should be expected that Europe’s sig-
nificance for China will grow as tensions in Chinese-American relations increase.
At political level, Chinese elites see the EU as an internally divided actor which 
needs China more than China needs it. Moreover, the EU is viewed as an actor 
which poses no threat to China’s key interests both in China’s immediate neigh-
bourhood in East Asia and globally. Confidence on the part of Chinese leader-
ship is boosted by the fact that China has proved to be resistant to socialization 
attempts that the EU made over the last decade. These attempts involved for 
example human rights protection and introduction of principles of the rule of 
law. Europe failed to exert significant influence on the development of China’s 
political system and on Beijing’s policy in specific areas, in spite of a number of 
dialogue-promoting institutions having been created.
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To a large extent, the attitude of the Chinese elite towards Europe will depend 
on the result of the reforms currently ongoing in China. Any successful change 
in the economic model will boost Beijing’s sense of advantage in bilateral rela-
tions and increase China’s assertiveness in its relations with Europe, mainly in 
the field of the economy. Similarly, China is likely to gradually raise its expec-
tations regarding Europe’s support for its actions in the international arena. 
However, the situation may change, should the current reforms end in a fiasco. 
In a situation of domestic policy failures, China’s perceived advantage over Eu-
rope could diminish and, as a consequence, give way to more balanced relations.
MARCIN KACzMARSKI
CO-OPERATION: JAKUB JAKóBOWSKI
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APPENDIX
Table 1. China’s volume of trade with the EU (2014, in millions euro)
State Imports from China
Exports  
to China
Volume  
of trade
Trade 
balance
EU28 (European Union) 302 143.2 164 623.0 466 766.2 -137 520
Germany 60 921.8 74 888.7 135 810.5 13 967
Netherlands 57 016.6 8 450.3 65 466.9 -48 566
United Kingdom 45 774.2 19 577.0 65 351.2 -26 197
France 25 450.6 16 190.1 41 640.7 -9 261
Italy 25 075.2 10 493.7 35 568.8 -14 581
Belgium 13 639.3 7 498.0 21 137.2 -6 141
Spain 16 528.9 4 058.8 20 587.7 -12 470
Poland 10 557.7 1 682.8 12 240.5 -8 875
Sweden 6 540.4 4 382.8 10 923.2 -2 158
Czech Republic 7 156.2 1 541.7 8 697.9 -5 614
Denmark 5 178.9 2 921.6 8 100.5 -2 257
Austria 4 892.9 2 980.9 7 873.8 -1 912
Hungary 4 813.1 1 408.2 6 221.3 -3 405
Finland 1 856.4 2 564.0 4 420.4 708
Slovakia 2 476.4 1 374.7 3 851.2 -1 102
Ireland 2 192.3 1 518.8 3 711.2 -674
Romania 2 353.9 566.7 2 920.6 -1 787
Greece 2 492.1 274.7 2 766.8 -2 217
Portugal 1 598.6 838.8 2 437.4 -760
Bulgaria 865.1 533.4 1 398.4 -332
Luxembourg 1 193.4 199.6 1 393.1 -994
Slovenia 1 130.9 215.1 1 346.0 -916
Lithuania 666.1 102.1 768.2 -564
Estonia 606.2 139.3 745.5 -467
Croatia 442.5 51.1 493.6 -391
Latvia 354.9 108.0 462.8 -247
Cyprus 221.5 39.3 260.7 -182
Malta 147.0 23.0 170.0 -124
Source: EUROSTAT: Trade EU28 – China, 2014
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Table 2. Accumulated China’s direct investments in the EU, comparison 
of figures compiled by Rhodium Group and by China’s Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM), in millions euro
State Rhodium Group (2000–2014)
MOFCOM*  
(2006–2014)
Austria 436.00 151.76
Belgium 928.00 371.28
Bulgaria 207.00 128.11
Croatia 4.00 8.93
Cyprus 31.00 80.63
Czech Republic 138.00 182.60
Denmark 134.00 156.61
Estonia 23.00 2.63
Finland 102.00 44.38
France 5 907.00 6 353.83
Germany 6 872.00 4 352.95
Greece 405.00 90.93
Hungary 1 891.00 418.59
Ireland 99.00 187.89
Italy 4 202.00 541.49
Latvia 3.00 0.41
Lithuania 30.00 9.39
Luxembourg 432.00 11 787.50
Malta 69.00 4.08
Netherlands 2 997.00 3 155.58
Poland 453.00 247.80
Portugal 5 138.00 45.66
Romania 733.00 143.98
Slovakia 40.00 96.15
Slovenia 8.00 3.76
Spain 1 096.00 323.17
Sweden 1 522.00 2 266.89
United Kingdom 12 212.00 9 634.08
EU28 (European Union) 46 112.00 40 791.05
* Calculated according to the average exchange rate USD/EUR recorded in 2014 (Credit Suisse): 1.3291
